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TOPIC I.B.2.
PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG
The Corporate Personality in American Law:
A Summary Review
I. TRADITIONAL THEORIES OF THE NATURE OF THE CORPORATE
PERSONALITY
Although recognition of the separate legal personality of the
corporation with existence as a juridical entity, separate from its
shareholders, goes back centuries, there has been worldwide contro-
versy as to the exact nature of the corporation as a legal institution.
In the United States, this development has gone through three
stages and is now entering a fourth.
First, in the early days of the Republic, the courts saw the cor-
poration as an "artificial person" in the terms expressed by the Eng-
lish authorities, Coke and Blackstone.' As Chief Justice Marshall
put it:
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and
existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere crea-
ture of law, it possesses only those properties which the
charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly or as
incidental to its very existence. ' '2
The corporation was a creation of the legislature with certain "core"
rights including the capacity to sue and be sued, the capacity to hold
and transfer property, and to have perpetual existence, irrespective
of any change in its shareholders. This view has been alternatively
called the artificial person, or fiction, or concession, or grant
doctrine.
As the Supreme Court commenced determination of the rights
of the corporation under the new federal Constitution, a second,
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1. See E. Coke, First Part of the Institute of the Law of England or a Commen-
tary on Littleton 6, 412 (1628); 2 id. at 250a; Case of Sutton's Hospital, 10 Coke 23a; 77
Eng. Rep. 960, 970-71 (1612) (the corporation is "invisible, immortal, and rests only in
the intendment and consideration of the law"); 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on
the Laws of England 470 (1st ed. 1765).
2. See Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636
(1819).
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more complex theory of the corporate personality emerged reflect-
ing the interests of the incorporators and shareholders of the corpo-
ration. The corporation was perceived as an association of
individuals contracting with each other in organizing the corpora-
tion, with its core attributes as an artificial legal person supple-
mented by the attribution to it of constitutional rights of its
shareholders. As Justice Field said in The Railroad Tax Cases:
Private corporations are, it is true, artificial persons but...
they consist of aggregations of individuals united for some
legitimate purpose ... It would be a most singular result if
a constitutional provision intended for the protection of
every person against partial or discriminatory legislation by
the states should cease to exert such protection the moment
the person becomes a member of the corporation . . .The
courts will always look beyond the name of the artificial be-
ing to the individuals whom it represents.3
This conception of the corporation has alternatively been called the
associational, or aggregate, or contract theory.
The essential feature of the artificial person theory was its em-
phasis on the central role of state action. The supplemental "associ-
ational" theory was reenforced by the growth of general
incorporation statutes in the nineteenth century making corporate
status freely available 4 and moving the predominant role in corpo-
rate organization from the state to the incorporators.
Third, the corporation has been perceived as an organic social
reality with an existence independent of, and constituting something
more than, its changing shareholders. This has been termed the nat-
ural entity or real entity or realism theory. Under this view, the
corporation is a juridical unit with its own claims, much like those of
a natural person, that extend beyond both the circumstances of its
legal creation by the state and the claims or interests of its share-
holders. It is the ultimate stage of the entity view or the "strong en-
tity" view.
As Professor Teubner points out, each of the competing conten-
tions involved in the "old dispute on the nature of corporate person-
ality have some validity and contributes to a better understanding of
3. See The Railroad Tax Cases, 13 F. 722, 744 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882), appeal dis-
missed as moot sub nom. San Mateo County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 116 U.S. 138
(1885).
4. New York enacted the first general incorporation statute as early as 1811;
this was the first in the world. N.Y. Act of Mar. 22, 1811, ch. 67. However, general
incorporation did not become the norm until the 1870s. See W. Hurst, The Legiti-
macy of the Business Corporation 37 (1970).
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the full dimensions of a "remarkably fluctuating reality." 5 The cor-
poration is indeed simultaneously a legal fiction, a contractual net-
work, and a "real" organization.
A remarkable amount of scholarly examination of these theo-
ries has continued for more than a century. After decades of debate,
the growth of the "legal realism" movement 6 during the 1920s led to
increasing recognition that, whatever its philosophical nature, the
corporation was a "means to achieve an economic purpose"7 and that
the fundamental issue was not one of theoretical concept but the ad-
aptation of the law to achieve an appropriate degree of control over
the activities of the corporation in the light of the values of the
times.
For half a century thereafter, the intensity of interest in the
problem of corporate personality ebbed. Then with the great in-
crease in the utilization of economics as a tool for examination of
legal institutions, libertarian scholars arguing for increased reliance
on market forces reopened the debate. Perceiving the corporation in
associational terms as a complex network of various contracting par-
ties,8 they sought to justify reduced governmental intervention in
economic matters by emphasizing the role of shareholders as con-
tracting parties in organizing the corporation9 and reasserting the
associational view.
The three traditional theories have much more than philosophi-
cal interest. They have helped shape the law. The view of the cor-
poration as an "artificial person" underlies entity law, the view of
the corporation with rights and duties separate from those of its
shareholders, for ages past the prevailing view of Western jurispru-
dence. Arising from historical and philosophical roots, this ancient
doctrine, which preceded the triumph of limited liability by centu-
ries, has been tremendously re-enforced by it.10 Entity law provides
5. See Teubner, "Enterprise Corporatism: New Industrial Policy and the 'Es-
sence' of the Legal Person," 36 Am. J. Comp. L. 130, 130-33, 138 (1988).
6. See L. Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale, 1927-60 ch. 1 (1986).
7. See Tanaka, J., dissenting in Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., (1970)
I.C.J. 3, 131-32. See also Bijur, J. in Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Pierson, 130 Misc.
110, 119, 222 N.Y.S. 532, 543 (Sup. Ct. 1927) ("more nearly a method than a thing"),
quoted in H. Henn and J. Alexander, Laws of Corporations 147 (3d ed. 1983); Dewey,
"The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality," 35 Yale L.J. 655 (1926).
8. See, e.g., Alchian and Demsetz, "Production, Information Costs and Eco-
nomic Organization," 62 Am. Econ. Rev. 777 (1972); Jensen and Meckling, "Theory of
the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structures," 3 Fin.
Econ. 305 (1976); Fama, "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," 88 J. Pol.
Econ. 288 (1980). See also Bratton, "The 'Nexus of Contract' Cooperation: A Critical
Appraisal," 74 Corn. L.Q. 407 (1989).
9. See R. Hessen, In Defense of the Corporation chs. 1, 2 (1979); R. Winter, Gov-
ernment and the Corporation (1978).
•10. See Blumberg, "Limited Liability and Corporate Groups," 11 J. Corp. L. 573,
577 et seq. (1986).
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the substratum on which Anglo-American corporation law rests.
The view of the corporation as an association or aggregate of the
individuals composing it played an important role in the late nine-
teenth century in facilitating the development of the law to broaden
and extend constitutional protections to corporations in order to pro-
tect the economic interests of shareholders. It survives today in
some areas of the law regulating in internal corporate affairs. Even
where adopted, however, it has been used tosupport the attribution
of shareholders' interests to the corporation for assertion by the cor-
poration not by shareholders." Moreover, it has had no influence
whatsoever in issues involving the imposition of liability or other
duties on shareholders. Thus, notwithstanding any philosophical in-
consistency, the doctrine has not led to any abandonment of entity
law or lack of full recognition of the corporation as a separate jur-idi-
cal unit.
The third stage, or the corporation as a "real entity," is the view
that has dominated corporation law for decades. It is. especially evi-
dent in the attribution to corporations of constitutional rights simi-
lar to those of natural persons in most cases.
American law is now entering a fourth stage. With the increas-
ing role in the society of large corporations typically operating as
multi-tiered multinational groups of parent and subsidiary corpora-
tions, the "real entity" view is being supplemented by increasing ef-
forts of statutory and common law in selected areas to deal with
corporate groups as an entity and to impose group obligations and
less frequently to recognize group rights as well. In this movement
still in its early stages, yet another theory of the corporation is be-
ginning to emerge.
In some areas of American law, particularly statutory law, tradi-
tional theories of the corporate personality are being increasingly
supplemented by a newer doctrine emphasizing enterprise over en-
tity. This theory of the corporate enterprise or corporate group as
the legal unit, while still inchoate, is particularly evident in such
concepts as the "control" standard in many federal regulatory and
tax statutes, the "unitary business" doctrine in state tax and consti-
tutional law, the "integrated enterprise" theory in labor relations
law, and in modern developments in "piercing the veil jurispru-
dence" which I have termed the law of corporate groups.' 2
11. Chief Justice Taney, among others, recognized that the associational theory
was theoretically inconsistent with the concept of limited liability. See Bank of Au-
gusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (5 Pet.) 519, 586 (1839).
12. See P. Blumberg, The Law of Corporate Groups: Procedural Problems of
Parent and Subsidiary Corporations (1983); P. Blumberg, The Law of Corporate
Groups: Problems in the Bankruptcy or Reorganization of Parent and Subsidiary
Corporations, Including the Law of Corporate Guaranties (1985); P. Blumberg, The
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II. THE CORPORATE PERSONALITY IN THE COURTS
A. Constitutional Applications
Although the traditional English concept of the separate legal
personality of the corporation had been firmly embraced by the
United States after the Revolution, this meant only that the corpo-
ration was a separate legal entity with fundamental core rights. En-
tity law provided no answer to the uncertainties of the application of
the new Constitution to corporations. In determining the extent to
which corporations could invoke constitutional provisions and obtain
constitutional rights in addition to their unchallenged core rights at
common law, the courts inevitably turned to theories of the corpo-
rate personality.
The new Republic knew little about corporations. At the time
of adoption of the Constitution, there were very few corporations.
As late as 1801, there were only 317 corporations in the entire coun-
try.13 These were almost entirely in banking, insurance, and public
service areas; only a handful were manufacturing corporations. De-
termining constitutional meaning with respect to a class of parties
with which neither the society nor the law had had much experi-
ence rendered the problem of constitutional construction even more
difficult.
The language of the Constitution further complicated the prob-
lem. Thus, the Constitution does not uniformly describe the parties
it protects. In different provisions, it refers to "citizens," "people,"
or "person." Other provisions generally prohibit certain acts by the
federal government without reference to the class protected. Did
these terms include corporations?
1. "Citizen"
a. Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction: Article III
The first corporate constitutional controversy arose in connec-
tion with the diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction of the federal
courts. Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution provides
that the federal judicial system may hear "cases" or "controversies"
involving "citizens" of different states."' This was clear enough in
Law of Corporate Groups: Tort, Contract, and Other Common Law Problems in the
Substantive Law of Parent and Subsidiary Corporations (1987); P. Blumberg, The
Law of Corporate Groups: Problems of Parent and Subsidiary Corporations under
Statutory Law of General Application (1989). The fifth volume dealing with statu-
tory law directly applicable to parent and subsidiary corporations being written with
Professor Kurt A. Strasser is expected to appear in 1992.
13. See 2 J. Davis, Essays in the Earlier History of American Corporations,
Number 4, Eighteenth Century Business Corporations in the United States 27 (1917)
(reissued 1965); W. Hupst, The Legitimacy of the Business Corporations 14 (1970).
14. See McGovney, "A Supreme Court Fiction: Corporations in the Diverse Citi-
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the case of natural persons, but what of corporations? Was a corpo-
ration a "citizen" for purposes of this provision? 5
Unless a corporation was a "citizen" or otherwise treated as a
"citizen," diversity of citizenship could not arise, and the federal
courts would be barred from all litigation involving corporate par-
ties, whether as plaintiff or defendant, insofar as common law and
corporation law matters were concerned.16 The scope of the new
federal judicial power over major areas of law affecting the new cor-
porate society was at stake.
This question arose in 1809 in Bank of the United States v. De-
veaux,17 in which a corporate action on a note was brought in the
federal courts under diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction. Chief Jus-
tice Marshall, writing for a unanimous court, first described the cor-
poration in language borrowed from the English law as a "mere
creature of the law, invisible, intangible, and incorporeal." He then
agreed that a corporation, "that invisible, intangible, and artificial
being, that mere legal entity is certainly not a citizen." Neverthe-
less, he upheld the action. He held that for purposes of determining
jurisdiction, the case was controlled by the citizenship of its share-
holders. He stated that the "controversy is, in fact and in law, be-
tween those persons [the shareholders] suing in their corporate
character, by their corporate name, for a corporate right" and the
other party. The term "citizen" is only used "to describe the real
persons who come into court, in this case, under their corporate
name."
18
The rationale of the decision in Bank of the United States v. De-
veaux is one of the earliest judicial expressions of the associational
view of the corporation. Chief Justice Marshall made it plain that
the associational view was superimposed upon, rather than replac-
ing, entity law. Thus, he carefully referred to the corporation as a
"mere creature of the law," "an artificial being" and "a mere legal
entity" and emphasize that the case involved the assertion in "corpo-
rate name" of a "corporate right."19 Shareholder interests served
only to support the attribution to corporate entities of access to the
zenship Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts," 56 Harv. L. Rev. 853 (1943) (hereinafter
cited as McGovney).
15. In the case of natural persons, citizenship was determined by residence, a
doctrine later confirmed in the Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. Const. amend.
XIV.
16. Such matters not involving federal constitutional or statutory questions or
admiralty matters may only be heard in the federal courts under diversity
jurisdiction.
17. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809).
18. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 86, 88, 91.
19. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 87.
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federal -courts and the assertion of federal jurisdiction over corpo-
rate litigation in the event of diversity.
Decades later in Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston Railroad v.
Letson,20 decided in 1844 and Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 21
decided in 1855, the Court abandoned this technique of looking
through corporate parties to the citizenship of their shareholders.
While recognizing that a corporation was not a "citizen" for this pur-
pose, it, nevertheless, continued to preserve the "valuable privilege"
of federal jurisdiction for corporations. The Court held that irre-
spective of the actual citizenship of shareholders, it would be conclu-
sively presumed that the shareholders of a corporation were citizens
of the state of incorporation.
b. Privileges and/or Immunities: Article Four and
Fourteenth Amendment
"Citizens" is also the crucial term in Article IV, Section 2, pro-
viding that "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the
privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States" and in
the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1 providing that "No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States." (emphasis added) In a
series of cases, the Court consistently held that corporations were
not "citizens" for these purposes and refused to apply Article IV and
the Fourteenth Amendment to invalidate state statutes discriminat-
ing against foreign corporations.
Writing for the Court in Bank of Augusta v. Earle,22 decided in
1839, Chief Justice Taney relied entirely on entity law and the "arti-
ficial person" theory. Pointedly refusing to apply the associational
theory, he stated: "Whenever a corporation makes a contract, it is
the contract of the legal entity; of the artificial being created by the
charter; and not the contract of the individual members. '23 He con-
cluded that a corporation was "a mere creature" of local law without
any "legal existence out of the boundaries of the sovereignty by
which it was created." Unlike Deveaux, the Court refused to look to
20. 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844).
In Letson, the Court rejected the Deveaux standard and reverted to the artificial
person view of the corporation. The Court had that for purposes of diversity jurisdic-
tion, a corporation was to be regarded as a "person, though an artificial one, inhab-
iting and belonging to" the state of incorporation and therefore "entitled, for the
purpose of suing and being sued, to be deemed a citizen of that state." 43 U.S. (2
How.) at 555. The holding in Letson that a corporation was a "citizen" was contro-
versial and did not long survive. In Marshall, decided nine years later, the Court
found it prudent to retreat in theory, but not in result.
21. Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 327-29 (1853).
22. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839).
23. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) at 587.
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the shareholders and outlaw such discrimination as a means of pro-
tecting shareholder rights. Chief Justice Taney made plain his con-
cern with the implications with respect to limited liability of
shareholders that could arise from a contrary decision resting on the
associational theory.24
In Paul v. Virginia,25 decided in 1868 under Article Four, and in
Pembina Consolidated Silver Mining and Milling Co. v. Penn-
sylvania,26 decided in 1888 under the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Court held that corporations were not "citizens" for purposes of
these provisions. Justice Field stated:
[T]he 'term citizens . . . applies only to natural persons,
members of the body politic owing allegiance to the State,
not to artificial persons created by the legislature, and pos-
sessing only such attributes as the legislature has
prescribed.2 7
Conceptually, the different conclusions on the two constitu-
tional references to "citizen[s]" are manifestly inconsistent. How-
ever, as a matter of constitutional development, opening the federal
courts to litigation involving corporations is a very different issue
than permitting states to exclude foreign corporations in matters not
involving interstate commerce. The fact that the same constitu-
tional term, "citizen" was employed did not prevent conflicting con-
clusions on its applicability to corporations. The Court reached its
differing results by drawing a distinction between natural persons
with recognized personal rights and artificial persons, to wit: corpo-
rations, lacking such rights.
2. "Person"
The term "person" is the crucial term in no less than four con-
stitutional provisions: the Equal Protection and the Due Process
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Self Incrimination
and the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Fifth Amendment. The
Court has held that corporations are protected persons under the
Equal Protection, Due Process, and Double Jeopardy Clauses, but
are not protected under the Self Incrimination Clause.
24. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) at 587. However, judicial use of the associational theory did
not lead to any threat to the political acceptance of limited liability. See Blumberg,
"Limited Liability and Corporate Groups," 11 J. Corp. L. 573, 587-95 (1986).
25. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
26. 125 U.S. 181 (1888). Article IV refers to "Citizens of each State" while the
Fourteenth Amendment refers to "citizens of the United States." Although Pem-
bina did not focus on this distinction, the Court subsequently seized on the distinc-
tion to make the provision the "all but forgotten clause of the Constitution."
Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). See Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S.
404, 443 (1935) (Stone, J., dissenting).
27. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 177.
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a. Equal Protection of the Laws: Fourteenth Amendment
The status of the corporation under the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment referring to "person" first arose
before the Supreme Court in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pa-
cific Railroad decided in 1886.28 Although the question had been ar-
gued at length in the various briefs, the Court surprisingly
announced:
The court does not wish to hear [oral] argument on the
question whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Constitution, which forbids a State to deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws applies to corporations. We are all of the opinion
that it does."
The Court's brief announcement threw no light on the rationale for
the conclusion. 2
9
b. Due Process of Law: Fourteenth Amendment
Pembina Consolidated Silver Mining and Milling Co. v. Penn-
sylvania followed two years after Santa Clara. The Court held that
a corporation - while not a "citizen" for purposes of the Privileges
or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as noted above
- was a "person" within the meaning of the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Amendment. The Court held: "Under the
designation of person [in the Amendment] there is no doubt that a
private corporation is included. Such corporations are merely as-
sociations of individuals united for a special purpose and permitted
to do business under a particular name and have a succession of
members without dissolution. '30
28. 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886).
Santa Clara and the constitutional protection of corporations as "person[s]"
under the Fourteenth Amendment has given risen to much academic discussion. For
some of the more recent literature, see, e.g., Flynn, "The Jurisprudence of Corporate
Personhood: The Misuse of a Legal Concept" in Corporations and Society: Power
and Responsibility 131 (W. Sanuels and A. Miller eds. 1987); Horwitz, "Santa Clara
Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory," 88 W. Va. L. Rev. 175 (1985)
(hereinafter cited as Horwitz); Hovenkamp, "The Classical Corporation in American
Legal Thought," 76 Geo. L. J. 1593, 1597-1601, 1640-51 (1988); Schane, "The Corpora-
tion Is a Person: The Language of a Legal Fiction," 61 Tulane L. Rev. 563 (1987)
(hereinafter called Schane.); Hager, "Bodies Politic: The Progressive History of Or-
ganizational 'Real Entity' Theory," 50 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 575 (1989). Comment, "The
Personification of the Business Corporation in American Law," 54 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1441 (1987) (hereinafter cited as Comment, Personification of the Corporation);
Note, "Constitutional Rights of the Corporate Person," 91 Yale L.J. 1641 (1982).
29. It is far from clear what the Court meant by its statement. See Comment,
Personification of the Corporation, supra note 28, at 1464 n.64.
30. 125 U.S. 181, 189 (1888). The description of the corporation is borrowed from
Justice Story's concurring opinion in the Dartmouth College case, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
518, 666 (1819).
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Pembina does not make it clear what kind of "person" the cor-
poration was in qualifying under the "persons" protected by the pro-
vision. Apparently not ready to conclude that corporations -
artificial persons that they were - generally qualified as "persons"
for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court found it nec-
essary to invoke the associational theory asserting that "corporations
are merely associations of individuals."
The Court soon took the final step. In Covington & Lexington
Turnpike Road Co. v. Sandford,31 decided in 1896, and in Southern
Railway v. Greene32 decided in 1910, the Court felt able to say that it
is "now settled" and "no longer open to question" that "corporations
are persons within the meaning of the constitutional provisions for-
bidding the deprivation of property without due process of law, as
well as denial of the equal protection of the laws." Southern Rail-
way represents the great divide. There, the Court went on to quote
the sentence in Pembina referring to the corporation as a "person"
for purpose of the constitutional provisions while pointedly omitting
from the quotation the very next sentence referring to corporations
as "merely associations of individuals."3:3 By so doing, the Court
showed that for the first time, it was prepared to rely solely on an
entity view treating the corporation as a "person" without any dis-
tinction between "artificial" and "natural" persons. The associa-
tional theory was no longer required to support the attribution of
constitutional rights to the corporate entity.
The Court had at last moved beyond both the artificial person
view in its pure form, or in its reenforced form involving reliance on
both the artificial person and the associational theories. It had
emerged with a new "strong entity" theory. In this more developed
concept, the corporation was for the first time explicitly recognized
as a "real" entity or person, qualifying with isolated exceptions34 for
the same rights as natural persons under the constitutional protec-
tion of the provision. In the process, the Court had emerged with a
doctrine under which all forms of business organizations - whether
sole proprietorship, partnership, or corporations - received very
much the same constitutional protection.
31. 164 U.S. 578, 592 (1896). In Sandford, the Court relied on Santa Clara, Pem-
bina, and two other decisions in which Justice Field had written the opinion.
32. 216 U.S. 400 (1910).
33. 216 U.S. at 412-13. The fuller quotation from Pembina appears in the text ac-
companying note 30 supra.
34. Corporations are not "citizens" for purposes of the Privilege and Immunities
Clauses of Article Four and the Fourteenth Amendment nor are they "person[s]" for
purposes of the Self Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Whether a cor-
poration is a "person" under the provisions of the Due Process Clause pertaining to
"liberty" as distinct from "property" is still not clear. Compare Northwestern Life
Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 255 (1906) with First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765 (1978). Nor is the full extent of a corporation's right of free speech settled.
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c. Self Incrimination: Fifth Amendment
In contrast to its decisions construing "person" in the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses to include "corporations," the
Court held in Hale v. Henkel, decided in 1906, that corporations
were not protected by the Self Incrimination Clause of the Fifth
Amendment providing: "nor shall [any person] be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself. .... ,,35
Justice Brown relied on the artificial person theory and on the
power of the states over the corporations created by them. He
stated:
... the corporation is a creature of the State. It is presumed
to be incorporated for the benefit of the public ... It would
be a strange anomaly to hold that a State, having chartered
a corporation to make use of certain franchises, could not in
the exercise of its sovereignty inquire how these franchises
had been employed, and whether they had been abused and
demand the production of the corporate books and papers
for that purpose.36
This markedly contrasts with Justice Brown's utilization of the asso-
ciational theory to apply the Unreasonable Searches and Seizures
Clause of the Fourth Amendment to a corporation in the very same
case, as discussed infra.
d. Double Jeopardy: Fifth Amendment
The Fifth Amendment provides: "nor shall any person be sub-
ject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb
... " Notwithstanding the inescapable reference to natural persons
in the use of such terms as "life or limb," the Court, without ex-
pressly deciding the issue, has repeatedly assumed the applicability
of the clause to corporations.37 Relying on such sub silentio hold-
ings, the lower federal courts have expressly held that corporations
are protected by the provision. 38
The different conclusions on the applicability to corporations of
35. 201 U.S. 43 (1906). Numerous subsequent cases have reaffirmed the inappli-
cability of the Self Incrimination Clause to corporations. E.g., Wilson v. United
States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911); Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 852 (1974); Essgee Co. v.
United States, 262 U.S. 151 (1923).
36. 201 U.S. at 74-75.
37. E.g., United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977); American
Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946). See Note, "Double Jeopardy and
Corporations: 'Lurking in the Record' and 'Ripe for Decision,'" 28 Stan. L. Rev. 805
(1976).
38. E.g., United States v. Hospital Monteflores, Inc., 575 F.2d 332 (1st Cir. 1978);
United States v. Security Nat'l Bank, 546 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 950 (1977). See Blumberg, The Law of Corporate Groups: General Statutory
Law, supra note 12, at § 3.06.
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the Fifth Amendment Clauses pertaining to Self Incrimination and
Double Jeopardy are particularly interesting as a textual matter.
Both clauses use the same term "person." In addition, the Self In-
crimination Clause follows immediately after the Double Jeopardy
Clause in the text of the Fifth Amendment, and, indeed, is gram-
matically part of the prior clause, sharing with it the same subject,
''person."
Further, the decisions applying the Double Jeopardy clause to
corporations are inconsistent with the decisions refusing to protect
corporations under the Self Incrimination clause. The associational
theory provides no explanation of the different construction of the
two companion clauses. Nor may one contend that the existence of
corporate injury damaging to shareholders from risk of trial and
conviction justifies invocation of the Double Jeopardy clause.39 The
very same factors are insufficient to result in application of the Self
Incrimination clause.
3. "The People"
a. Unreasonable Searches and Seizures: Fourth
Amendment
Hale v. Henkel not only involved the applicability to corpora-
tions of the constitutional protection to "person[s]" against self in-
crimination in the Fifth Amendment, as discussed above. It also
involved the applicability of the protection granted to "the people"
against unreasonable searches and seizures in the Fourth Amend-
ment.40 The Court in Hale v. Henkel4l held that the term "people"
protected corporations against the production of corporate records
seized under circumstances violating the provision.
Justice Brown relied on the associational theory,4 2 asserting: "A
corporation, is, after all, but an association of individuals under an
assumed name and with a distinct legal entity. In organizing itself
as a collective body, it [the association of individuals] waives no con-
stitutional immunities appropriate to such body. '4 3
This invocation of the associational theory contrasts with Jus-
tice Brown's refusal to look beyond the artificial person view in re-
39. See, e.g., United States v. Armco Steel Corp., 252 F. Supp. 364, 368 (S.D. Cal.
1966).
40. The Fourth Amendment provides: "The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated." U.S. Const. amend. IV.
41. 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
42. The Court also emphasized the importance of the economic interests at
stake. In further support of its result, the Court stated: "Corporations are a neces-
sary feature of modern business activity and their aggregated capital has become the
source of nearly all great enterprises." 201 U.S. at 76.
43. 201 U.S. at 76.
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fusing to protect corporations under the Self Incrimination Clause in
the very same case.
It is evident that the different results in Hale v. Henkel do not
turn on the different terminology employed: "people" in the Fourth
Amendment and "person" in the Fifth. The Court perhaps refused
to protect corporations under the Self Incrimination clause because
such an action in no way clashed with or eroded the personal claims
of shareholders to be protected under the clause. By contrast, the
Court could more readily uphold the applicability of the Unreasona-
ble Search and Seizures clause because the rights of shareholders
against search and seizure could be attributed to the corporation
under the associational theory.
4. General Constitutional Prohibitions on Governmental
Power
The Supreme Court has considered the applicability to corpora-
tions of two constitutional provisions imposing general limitations
on governmental action: the prohibitions against impairment of con-
tracts and abridging freedom of speech or press.
a. Impairment of Contracts: Article I
Article I, Section 10[1], Clause 5 provides: No State shall ...
pass any . . . law impairing the obligation of contract." The cele-
brated Dartmouth College case,44 decided in 1819, involved a chal-
lenge to the constitutionality of a New Hampshire statute changing
the governance structure of the College from that provided in the
original charter. While the Court affirmed the traditional view of
the corporation as an "artificial being" or "person" created by the
state, it concluded that the corporate charter was not simply a state
grant or concession but was also a contract between the state and
the incorporators, 45 and the amendatory statute was an unconstitu-
tional impairment of the contract in violation of Article I. As in De-
veaux, decided ten years earlier, the Court, after affirming the
continued vitality of entity law in determining the fundamental na-
ture of the corporate personality, again embraced the associational
view to expand the boundaries of corporate constitutional rights.
46
44. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 642-44
(1819).
45. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 642-44. See also Providence Bank v. Billings, 29 U.S. (4
Pet.) 514, 560 (1830) (Marshall, C.J.) ("... it is not denied, that a charter incorporat-
ing a bank is a contract.").
46. This appears plainly in Justice Story's concurring opinion: "An aggregate
corporation... is a collection of individuals united into one collective body, under a
special name, and possessing certain immunities, privileges, and capacities in its col-
lective character, which do not belong to the natural persons composing it." 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) at 667.
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b. Freedom of Speech: First Amendment
The First Amendment, Clause 2 provides: "Congress shall
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."
This prohibition restrains such action by the states as well; the
Court has held that the Due Process Clause in the Fourteenth
Amendment binding the states incorporates the First Amendment.47
In First National Bank v. Bellotti48 decided in 1978, the Court
held by a five-to-four vote that a Massachusetts statute restricting
corporate political expenditures to influence public referenda or is-
sues, except on matters materially affecting the corporation, was un-
constitutional because it violated the guaranty of free speech of the
First Amendment.
Writing for a bare majority of the Court, Justice Powell did not
find it necessary to articulate his own theory of the nature of the
corporation in order to dispose of the case. Instead, he relied on the
fundamental value of "the right of public discussion" from the socie-
tal point of view 49 and held that a corporation could not be constitu-
tionally barred from discussion of public issues. The four dissenters
would have upheld the statute in reliance on the artificial person
theory; they concluded that the corporation was only a creature of
the state possessing only those rights granted it by the State.50 Jus-
tice Powell characterized this contention as "extreme. '51
5. Terminology or Nature of Interest
In the light of the Court's inconsistent applications to corpora-
tions of constitutional provisions, it should be apparent that the deci-
sions are not controlled by the terminology employed. Similarly, the
inconsistent utilization of conflicting theories of corporate personal-
ity indicates that the theories are utilized to support results, rather
than as guiding principles to help reach them.
As Justice Powell stated in First, National Bank v. Bellotti:
"Whether or not a particular [constitutional] guarantee is 'purely
personal' [that is, available only to natural persons] or is unavailable
for corporations for some other reason depends on the nature, his-
tory, and purpose of the particular constitutional provision. '5 2
"[N]ature, history, and purpose" control. Constitutional terminology
47. See Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697
(1931); L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 11-2 (1988).
48. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
49. 435 U.S. at 778 n.14, 783, 792.
50. 435 U.S. at 809 (Rehnquist, C.J.); 435 U.S. at 824 (White, J.).
51. However, in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107 S.Ct. 1637, 1649
(1987), Justice Powell surprisingly relied on this very passage.
52. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 768-69, 778 n.14 (1978).
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and theories of the corporate personality - while not unimportant
and utilized to justify the result - are not decisive.
B. State Corporation Law
When we turn from constitutional litigation to other areas of
the law, we find many references to traditional entity law in the de-
cisions insulating shareholders from responsibility for corporate ac-
tions53 but relative little discussion of the nature of the corporate
personality. This should be no surprise since the discussion of cor-
porate personality to date has been concerned with the attribution
of rights not the imposition of duties.
The associational theory of the corporation may be seen in the
older common law insistence on unanimous stockholder approval for
certain fundamental corporate changes, such as the merger or disso-
lution or sale of all, or substantially all, the assets of the business.
These events are perceived as departures from the contract among
shareholders underlying the foundation of the corporation and
therefore, require the consent of all contracting parties.54 While this
requirement for unanimity has vanished from most statutes, some
vestiges of the "contract" principle remain to this day. Such exam-
ples include the doctrine of "waste, '55 and elimination of preferred
stock dividend arrearages by charter amendment.56 It should be
noted, however, that each of these matters relates to the internal
governance of the corporation and to the allocation of corporate
decisionmaking authority between the directors and the sharehold-
ers. None involves the corporation's dealings with the larger world.
C. "Piercing the Veil Jurisprudence"
Inevitably, the doctrine of each corporation as a separate and
distinct entity with its own obligations for which its shareholders
had no liability led in some cases to results that, however concep-
53. See P. Blumberg, The Law of Corporate Groups: Substantive Common Law,
supra note 12, at ch. 6.
54. See, e.g., Mason v. Pewabic Mining Co., 133 U.S. 50, 59 (1890); State ex rel.
Brown v. Bailey, 16 Ind. 46 (1861); McCray v. Junction R.R., 9 Ind. 358 (1857); Abbott
v. American Hard Rubber Co., 33 Barb. 578 (N.Y. 1861); Stevens v. Rutland & Bur-
lington R.R., 29 Vt. 545 (1851), collected in Horwitz, supra note 28, at 200 n. 128. See
also V. Morawetz, A Treatise on the Law of Private Corporations iii (2d ed. 1886).
55. See A.L.I., Principles of Corporate Governance § 1.34 (Tent. Draft No. 5,
1986) ("A transaction constitutes a 'waste of corporate assets' if its terms are such
that no person of ordinary sound business judgment would say that the considera-
tion received by the corporation was a fair exchange for what was received by the
corporation").
56. See Keller v. Wilson & Co., 21 Del. Ch. 318, 190 A. 115 (1936) (statutory
power authorizing shareholder amendment of charters did not permit amendment
cancelling preferred stock accrued unpaid dividends) (subsequently overruled by
statute).
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tually sound under the doctrines of entity law and limited liability,
were unacceptable to the courts in the particular case before them.
The law required a safety valve. The doctrine of "piercing" or "lift-
ing" the veil, or disregard of entity in "exceptional" cases, first
emerged in cases involving controlled corporations and controlling
individual shareholders and were subsequently automatically ap-
plied to cases involving corporate groups as well.5 7 The cases adapt-
ing "piercing the veil jurisprudence" to corporate groups constitute
the raw material out of which American enterprise law or a law of
corporate groups is beginning to emerge out of episodic, incremental
judicial decisions.58
In a growing number of areas, the application of "piercing the
veil jurisprudence" to constituent companies of corporate groups is
beginning to emerge as a form of enterprise law. Although these
cases do not as yet reflect a well-defined body of law, they represent
the early stages of the development of a law of corporate groups.
Such cases combine "control," particularly intrusive exercise of
control over the decisionmaking processes of a subsidiary, with five
very different elements to establish a foundation for disregard of the
corporate entity: (a) lack of indicia of separate corporate organiza-
tion such as separate offices, telephone numbers, stationery, plants,
employees, or equipment; (b) lack of compliance with corporate for-
malities, such as failure to hold meetings of directors and sharehold-
ers, absence of minutes of meetings, lack of records,, books of
account, tax returns or reports; (c) lack of adequate capitalization
commensurate to the risks and scale of the enterprise being under-
taken; (d) group integration (economic integration, administrative
interdependence, and financial interdependence); and (e) use of a
common group public persona.59
Even where such factors have been shown, however, most, but
not all, courts applying "piercing the veil jurisprudence" in common
law cases still require additional proof of some "inequitable" or
"morally culpable" or "fundamentally unfair" conduct of the parent
corporation (or controlling shareholder) prejudicing creditors before
the court will disregard the separate entity to impose liability or at-
tribute other legal consequences to the parent or other affiliated
corporations. 60
Such disregard of entity of a constituent company of a corporate
57. See Blumberg, "Limited Liability and Corporate Groups," 11 J. Corp. L. 574,
605-11 (1986).
58. This development is reviewed in the author's volumes in the series constitut-
ing The Law of Corporate Groups to which readers are referred. See supra note 12.
59. See P. Blumberg, The Law of Corporate Groups: Substantive Common Law,
supra note 12, at chs. 6, 10-11, 19-20.
60. See, id., at §§ 9.02, 9.03, 18.01, 18.02.
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group and recognition of the corporate group as the relevant juridi-
cal unit for imposition of liability through "piercing the veil" occurs
only in "rare" or "exceptional" cases. Courts exercise their powers
of equitable intervention to prevent unacceptable conduct in particu-
larly egregious cases. To establish a more satisfactory level of so-
cial control over multinational groups and their constituent
companies, enterprise law would have to reach the normal, not the
exceptional, aspects of multinational conduct. It would have to rest
on the economic reality of the integrated operations of the constitu-
ents of the controlled group without regard to the existence of par-
ticular occasions of "inequitable" or other "morally culpable"
conduct.
There are some signs the law is moving in this direction. In
the area of American statutory law in particular, the "piercing the
veil" decisions are increasingly recognizing that the stringent re-
quirements of the traditional doctrine must be significantly relaxed
in order to implement statutory objectives and prevent evasion or
frustration of the statutory program.6 1
D. "Unitary Business"
The "unitary business" doctrine in U.S. constitutional law pro-
vides still another example of a judicial doctrine employing concepts
of enterprise law.62 The doctrine provides a workable standard for
determination of liability on constituent companies of corporate
groups in the area of state taxation.
In five decisions from 1980 to 1983,63 the Supreme Court devel-
oped the theory of the "unitary business" as the standard for deter-
mining the constitutionality of the taxation by states of local
affiliates of multinational enterprises by apportionment formulae
taking into account the worldwide activities of the group of which
the local affiliate was a constituent part.
Combining such factors as "control," economic integration and
centralized managerial structure, the Court stressed that "the un-
61. See P. Blumberg, The Law of Corporate Groups: General Statutory Law,
supra note 12, at § 2.05.3. See also, e.g., United States v. Advance Mach. Co., 547 F.
Supp. 1085 (D. Minn. 1982); United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Penntech Papers,
Inc., 439 F. Supp. 610, 620-21 (D. Me. 1977), aff'd sub noma. United Paperworkers Int'l
Union v. T.P. Property Corp., 583 F.2d 33 (1st Cir. 1978).
62. See P. Blumberg, The Law of Corporate Groups: General Statutory Law,
supra note 12, at § 4.08.
63. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980); Exxon Corp.
v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207 (1980); ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax
Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307 (1982); F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 458
U.S. 454 (1982); Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, reh'g denied, 464
U.S. 909 (1983).
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derlying economic realities of a unitary business" are decisive64 and
refused to recognize formal distinctions between entities in the
group corporate structure. In its analysis, the Court emphasized
such factors as economies of scale, centralized management, and
functional integration. The test is the existence of a "highly inte-
grated business which benefits from an umbrella of centralized man-
agement and controlled interaction. '65
III. THE CORPORATE PERSONALITY IN REGULATORY STATUTES
The early American statutes regulating the business economy,
such as the transportation acts, utilized entity law and suffered de-
cades of ineffectiveness in dealing with railroad systems organized as
corporate groups. With this unhappy experience before the Con-
gress, major regulatory statutes commencing with the wave of re-
form in the New Deal period after 1933 instead frequently relied on
principles of enterprise law utilizing the standard of "control." A
more complex doctrine combining "control" with other factors has
been utilized in the labor relations and employment discrimination
area. The federal tax laws have for decades incorporated enterprise
principles for particular sections of the Internal Revenue Code
although the standards turning on "control" vary remarkably from
section to section.
A. "Control"
In numerous American statutes,66 the standard of "control" ex-
tends the scope of the statutory regulatory program beyond the cor-
poration conducting the regulated activity in question to other
members of the corporate group of which it is a constituent. A com-
mon reference extends the statutory reach beyond the corporation
conducting the regulated activity to "any corporation controlling it,
controlled by it, or under common control. '6 7 "Control" has been
employed to transform the statutory scope from entity law to enter-
prise law and to sweep under the enactment an entire corporate
group whenever any constituent company is subject to its provisions.
For such purposes, some statutes set forth rebuttable presumptions
64. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 440-41 (1980).
65. Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 224 (1980).
66. Such statutes include the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1982); Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1982); Federal Communications Act
of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 219(a) (1982); Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 310 (1982);
Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 825c (1982); Internal Revenue Code 26 U.S.C.
§§ 246A, 267, 269, 304, 368(c), 582(b), 957, 1504(a)(2), 1551(b), 1563.
67. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3), (11) (1982) (Securities Act of 1933); 47 U.S.C.
§ 152(b)(2) (1982) (Federal Communications Act of 1933).
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of "control" arising from voting power over 10 percent 68 or 25 per-
cent of the voting shares. 69 The Internal Revenue Code uses
benchmarks ranging from 50 to 80 percent.
B. "Integrated Enterprise"
Another standard utilizing the economic enterprise rather than
the legal entity as the basis for statutory regulation is the "inte-
grated enterprise" or "single employer" doctrine developed in
American labor law by the National Labor Relations Board70 and
upheld by the Supreme Court.71 Under the "integrated enterprise"
standard,72 separate but closely related and "sufficiently inte-
grated"73 concerns constitute a "single employer" for determination
of certain issues arising under the National Labor Relations Act.74
In addition, the "integrated enterprise" standard also controls intra-
group application of the American employment discrimination stat-
utes - Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196475 and The Age
Discrimination in Employment Act.76
The "integrated enterprise" standard is functional, not concep-
tual. It looks to four factors throwing light on the degree of interre-
lationship of the affiliated corporations: (a) interrelation of
operations; (b) centralized control of labor relations; (c) common
management; (d) and common ownership or financial control.
C. "Enterprise"
Less significant examples of reliance on enterprise rather than
entity in American statutory law may be found in the "enterprise"
concepts utilized in the Fair Labor Standards Act 77 and the Racke-
teering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.178 The Fair La-
bor Standards Act defines "enterprise " as
the related activities performed (either through unified op-
eration or common control) by any person or persons for a
common business purpose, and includes all such activities
68. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 79b(a)(7), (8), (11) (1982) (P-iblic Utility Holding Company
Act of 1935).
69. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(9) (1982) (Investment Company Act of 1940).
70. See 6 Fed. Reg. Empl. Serv. (Law. Co-op) §§ 46:8, 46:22 (1978).
71. Radio & Television Broadcast Technicians Local Union v. Broadcast Serv. of
Mobile, Inc., 380 U.S. 255 (1965) (per curiam).
72. See P. Blumberg, The Law of Corporate Groups: General Statutory Law,
supra note 12, at § 13.03; 6 Fed. Reg. Empl. Serv. (Law. Co-op) §§ 45:7, 45:93 to 45:94
(1982).
73. See 21 NLRB Ann. Rep. 14 (1956).
74. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1982).
75. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1982).
76. 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (1982), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 623(h) (Supp. 1988).
77. 29 U.S.C. § 203(r) (1982).
78. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. (1982).
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whether performed in one or more establishments or by
one or more corporate or other organizational units.79
IV. CONCLUSION
The past discussion of the nature of the corporate personality in
the United States has become doubly irrelevant. First, the commen-
taries have virtually ignored the modern development of corporate
groups. As a result, the discussion rests on a stereotyped view of
"the corporation" that with the passage of time no longer realisti-
cally describes the corporate world. Second, the discussion has been
overwhelmingly concerned with an inquiry into the question of the
rights to be accorded to the corporation, particularly rights of a cor-
poration under the U.S. Constitution. These issues arose with great-
est intensity a century ago in the days of vigorous economic
development when recognition of corporate interests to promote
economic growth had a special appeal. They have long since been al-
most entirely settled. Today, reflecting the dramatic change in the
nature of corporate society, the crucial issue for heavily industrial-
ized societies the world over, seeking to assure corporate responsibil-
ity and accountability, has become the reverse, the imposition of
duties upon corporations, not the recognition of their rights.
In the face of modern economic development with its funda-
mental changes in corporate structure and operations, it has become
necessary to undertake a fundamental reconsideration of entity law.
Traditional views of the corporate personality in American law have
become increasingly inadequate. The problems of a complex corpo-
rate system in the modern industrial age dominated by large multi-
national corporations with hundreds of thousands of public share-
holders and corporate structures of "incredible complexity"80 have
outstripped traditional corporation law, shaped long ago under very
different conditions.
Corporation law in the United States (and in other countries as
well) is breaking down because of the increasing tension between
conventional entity law deeming each corporation a separate juridi-
cal person, irrespective of its interrelationships with its affiliated
corporations, and the economic reality of a complex industrial soci-
ety predominantly conducted by corporate groups: parent compa-
nies, sub-holding, companies, and scores or hundreds of subsidiary
companies collectively conducting worldwide integrated enterprises.
The predominance of such powerful multinational corporate com-
plexes is creating irresistible pressures for the development of new
legal concepts to impose more effective societal controls than those
79. 29 U.S.C. § 203(r) (1982).
80. See Hadden, "Inside Corporate Groups," 12 Int'l J. Soc. L. 273, 274 (1984).
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available under traditional entity law reflecting the society of centu-
ries ago.81
In light of such developments, it is no longer realistic to adhere
to the traditional view that for legal purposes, each of the corpora-
tions in a corporate group is a separate legal entity with rights and
duties unaffected by its functioning as a constituent of the group col-
lectively conducting a common business under common control. It is
time to consider whether the parent and affiliated companies of the
group should also be liable in the particular case for the duties and
obligations of the relevant subsidiary in order either to protect per-
sons dealing with companies of the group in cases arising at common
law or to implement governmental controls and prevent their frus-
tration and evasion more effectively in cases involving statutory
law.
8 2
This requires a fundamental reconsideration of the traditional
doctrines of entity law and the development of principles of enter-
prise law. Statutory law in the United States provides the most ad-
vanced examples of the response of the American legal system in
dealing with this challenge. In various areas of the American com-
mon law, as well, some courts have made progress in pushing be-
yond the sterile confines of "piercing the veil jurisprudence" in the
incipient formulation of enterprise law. Even in these early stages
in the development of enterprise law, it is possible to discern a dif-
ferent theory of the corporate personality and an emerging law of
corporate groups. This is a major problem of the legal order and ur-
gently calls out for intensive scholarly examination and discussion.
81. See Wedderburn, "Multinationals and the Antiquities of Company Law," 47
Mod. L. Rev. 87, 90 (1984) (reviewing the "geriatric difficulties" of entity law in deal-
ing with Multinational groups).
82. For a more extended discussion of the inadequacy of traditional theories of
the corporate personality in a world economy dominated by multi-tiered multina-
tional corporate groups, see Blumberg, "The Corporate Entity in an Era of Multina-
tional Corporations," 15 DeL J. Corp. L. #2 (1990).

